

Page 2 HEARING Re: Notice of Agenda of Matters Scheduled for Hearing on September 18, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. Motion to Shorten Time for MOACs Motion (i) for a Stay Pending Appeal; and (ii) to Expedite Transmittal of Record on Appeal to district Court (related document(s)5110) Motion to Stay Pending Appeal and to Expedite Transmittal of Record on Appeal to District Court Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

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Page 5 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Good morning. 3 MR. BEEBY: Good morning, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: In re Sears Holdings Corporation. Let 5 me just -- I think everyone got the word on this, but the 6 confirmation hearing in Sears has been adjourned, and the 7 only matter on today's calendar is the motion by MOAC, 8 M-O-A-C, Mall Holdings LLC, for a stay pending appeal of my 9 September 5, 2019 order authorizing the assumption of 10 assignment of the MOAC mall lease to Transform. 11 So I've read the parties' pleadings in connection 12 with this matter. I'm happy to hear oral argument. So MOAC 13 have the burden, so you can go first. 14 MR. BEEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Alex Beeby with Larkin Hoffman on behalf of MOAC Mall 15 16 Holdings. I'm here with Daniel Lowenthal of Patterson, 17 Belknap, Webb & Tyler. And I believe Tom Flynn may be 18 listening on the phone but not participating. 19 As a preliminary matter, there is also a related 20 motion to shorten time to have this expedited hearing, which 21 there's been no objections. 22 THE COURT: That's correct. I didn't see any 23 objection to that. The parties agree to the matter, so --24 MR. CHESLEY: Richard Chesley on behalf of 25 Transform. No, Your Honor. No objection.

Pq 6 of 17 Page 6 1 THE COURT: All right. So that motion is granted. 2 MR. BEEBY: With regard to the stay motion, 3 essentially MOAC is looking to reserve its right for appellate review of some very important legal issues, which 4 5 -- for which there are no yet binding decisions. 6 The Mall -- MOAC is looking to protect Mall of 7 America and its tenants. And respecting your decision, Your 8 Honor, we believe that there is a strong argument on appeal. 9 The decision -- your decision is based on legal 10 interpretations that have not yet been reviewed by binding 11 courts and extending some of those legal interpretations to 12 new circumstances. Also note that there's no reason that a 13 tenant search cannot continue. There's been one underway 14 for several months now. And again, I want to reiterate that 15 there are some important legal issues here that do warrant 16 appellate review. And foreclosing review of those issues at 17 that time would not be in the public interest either. 18 THE COURT: Well, the irreparable harm here is not based on a particular imminent transaction, right? Are we 19 20 aware of any proposed sublease of the -- of any material 21 portion of the space? 22 MR. BEEBY: No, Your Honor. And that would be 23 dealing with equitable mootness. Thea's both legal --24 THE COURT: Well, what is the harm then?

The harm is that if there is no stay,

MR. BEEBY:

Page 7 1 the appeal itself would be rendered legally moot. 2 MR. CHESLEY: By? THE COURT: By -- well, there's a case I refer the 3 4 Court to, a couple of cases. I mentioned the In re 5 (indiscernible) in the -- in the dispute. 6 THE COURT: But it would be rendered moot by the 7 subletting, right? 8 MR. BEEBY: No. I mean --9 THE COURT: What else -- what else would render it 10 moot? 11 MR. BEEBY: By virtue of 363. So this lease was 12 assigned. The assignment is a product of the 363 sale, and 13 363(m) comes into play. Which in In re Gucci, which is a 14 Second Circuit case here, which is 105 F.3d 837. In that 15 case, a sale appeal was rendered legally moot by a one-day 16 17 THE COURT: But you're not -- you're not appealing the whole sale. 18 19 MR. BEEBY: No, we're not. 20 THE COURT: You're appealing the assignment order. 21 MR. BEEBY: Correct. 22 THE COURT: So and if you were appealing the whole sale, which is already closed, I understand your argument. 23 24 I would also require a bond equal to the sale consideration price. But we're just talking here about the --25

I really believe at this point, we're taking about just one of the roughly 600 -- well, I guess a few stores were -- oh, well, no. It was all leased. 600 leases that we're talking about here. In that context, I can't imagine 363(m) as far as the sale is concerned applying here. Are you going to rely on 363(m)? I mean, if you were, I would think the sale would've closed already.

MR. CHESLEY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So it -- so it would be moot already.

MR. CHESLEY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you're not relying on -- you wouldn't -- you're not going to go to the district and say 363(m) applies here. This is over.

MR. CHESLEY: Well, we -- in effect, because we do not have a transaction, I think we couldn't rely on 363(m) for the purposes of arguing mootness because we have not closed on a transaction to assume and assign this to a subdebtor.

THE COURT: The specific assign.

MR. CHESLEY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I think the focus really is on the sublease, and there you have the procedure under 6.3, which is a lengthy procedure. It would certainly give you plenty of time to seek to expedite an appeal. But the record before me, which hasn't been

contested, is that it's going to take months to sublease this premises.

In fact, I believe that two years was fairly tight and required a condition, which is that the landlord not interfere with the process. So I just -- it doesn't seem like there's any -- no, obviously you want to generally have appeals for -- promptly, and four district judges in this courthouse are really quite good in ruling promptly on appeals, but I don't see the urgency here.

MR. BEEBY: Well, Your Honor. Our argument is based on looking at other cases in which there has been an assignment of the lease that was rendered moot where -- and they're across the country -- where there is no stay, that a stay is required for assignment of a -- to protect the appeal of an assignment of a lease.

THE COURT: Well, we just went through that.

They're not going to rely on 363(m) because this transaction was done -- you don't need a further closing, right?

MR. BEEBY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No. There's no further closing. This is already done, so if you're really making that argument, then it really is moot already because you should've appealed the sale order. This is not -- this is a 365 order. It's an outgrowth of the sale. It's not a 363(m), and they're not going to rely on 363(m), which Mr. Chesley's

Page 10 1 just reiterated for the second time. 2 MR. BEEBY: And that's -- and I appreciate that. My concern would be that a review in court would 3 independently --4 5 THE COURT: Well, but if --6 MR. BEEBY: -- look to the appeal as being moot. 7 THE COURT: They're -- they would be judicially 8 estopped because one of the four factors that -- and one of 9 the two, by far, most important factors for a stay pending 10 appeal is the likelihood of irreparable harm. So if I deny 11 your motion because there's no likelihood of irreparable 12 harm, then I can't see how they could then go --13 notwithstanding the representation to me -- and go to the 14 district court and say that 363(m) applies because that's 15 the only irreparable harm you're saying exists is the 16 potential application of 363(m). 17 MR. BEEBY: That is correct, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BEEBY: That is the court -- and if they're --19 20 we would seek leave to seek a new stay should the 21 circumstances come about in which an equitable mootness 22 argument would become right. 23 THE COURT: Okay. But it just, to me, that -- at this point, you really haven't carried your burden on that 24 25 -- on that score, as I think you just acknowledged because

Page 11 1 you're basically saying you would seek the right -- we would 2 reserve the right to seek a stay if that was going to 3 happen. 4 MR. BEEBY: That is -- that is absolutely --5 THE COURT: But that's going to be a whole other 6 set of facts. 7 MR. BEEBY: Correct. THE COURT: Because they're under the lease, you 8 9 know. 6.3, there's a whole procedure for notice about 10 pending transactions. 11 MR. BEEBY: Do you have any further questions, 12 Your Honor? I believe that actually addresses --13 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BEEBY: -- pretty much all of the issues 14 15 before the Court, unless there are other issues that --16 THE COURT: Well, I mean, I -- just go -- for the 17 -- I mean, given that there is no real showing of irreparable harm -- and, by the way, I do believe that, 18 generally speaking, risk of mootness standing alone doesn't 19 20 constitute irreparable injury, although there are times 21 when, again, the very fact of 363(m) might. But then, of 22 course, you -- then you have the bond requirement, which I 23 think if 363(m) were in fact to be relied on by both sides, 24 the bond here would be enormous, as it was in Adelphia. That's the second part of Judge Scheindlin's opinion or set 25

of opinions in the case, which is the case you're relying on for the mootness point.

But I also -- because of the lack of irreparable harm, I don't believe a stay is in the public interest given the need under the two-year deadline that my order proposes for Transform to market the property and the cloud that the stay would have over the marketing process.

And finally, on the -- on the issue of the merits, obviously it's always a bit awkward for an appellant to argue that there's a substantial showing (indiscernible) on the merits when it's making that argument to the judge that issued the order, which is what you have to do under Rule 8007.

But I've always been of the belief that not only is no judge perfect but also that there are issues where it truly is a close call, and I would like to think that I would know that when rendering an opinion on the stay pending appeal or request for a stay pending appeal.

And of course, under the majority and, I believe, controlling standard in the second circuit, which may also be the controlling standard set by the Supreme Court, evaluating the merits factor in conjunction with the irreparable harm factor is basically a balance. The more irreparable harm, the less of a showing on the merits and vice versa.

Here, I think you'd have to have a huge showing on the merits because there's no irreparable harm. It would be more than substantial. I think it would have to be quite strong.

And while, at this point, we're dealing with district court and bankruptcy court opinions, we're also dealing with legislative history and a basic underlying principle. First, it appears to me that Judge (indiscernible) opinion and the multiple opinions on Toys "R" Us are well reasoned and consistent with the statute which has an introductory clause that refers to adequate assurance performance under the lease, referring to the lease.

And as importantly, perhaps more importantly, although Congress in the bankruptcy code at times varies the contractual expectations of the parties -- most obviously since bankruptcy permits satisfaction of a default with tiny bankruptcy dollars under certain circumstances -- generally speaking, the parties' rights under the non-bankruptcy law govern their rights vis-à-vis each other.

And it's extremely unusual, perhaps only -- I can think of perhaps only one instance, and there the courts are in disagreement, where Congress in the bankruptcy code gave a non-debtor party greater rights than under their contract. That one instance that I can think of is under section 1114

where Congress was under enormous pressure by the public in light of the LTV case to prevent the termination of retiree benefits.

And arguably, at least according to two out of three judges of the Third Circuit, overrode provisions in actual benefit agreements that permitted a debtor to terminate those agreements and provided, at least for permanent terminations, that the debtor could not do that without going through the 1114 process. Other courts, including myself, have said that even there, Congress couldn't have meant that it would write out a provision beneficial to a debtor in a -- in a contract that governed the parties' pre-bankruptcy relationship.

Of course, in that context, there's a bit of a hook because Congress could've been aware that a decision to enforce an agreement that would deprive retirees of ongoing benefits is a decision that's reviewable by the court. But it appears to me truly inconceivable that where sophisticated parties agreed to the terms of a lease, particularly a lease that gave the parties a buyout mechanism whereby a landlord -- namely MOAC -- could preserve control, and 6.3 of this lease does, it would confer on the landlord benefits that were not in the lease itself.

Frankly, I don't -- I -- you know, bankruptcy has

Page 15 1 been held to be consistent with the takings provision 2 because bankruptcy is also in the constitution. But to say that that extra right could be added for a non-bankrupt 3 4 party might raise serious constitutional issues, i.e. 5 rewriting the parties' agreement for the benefit of the non-6 debtor. In any event, I just don't see that Congress meant 7 to do that and the parties were bound by their arguments. 8 So, I don't think you've made the -- in this case 9 -- the necessary very strong showing, so really none of the 10 factors are met here. But the real -- the key inquiry is on 11 the irreparable harm, for what its' worth. So I'll deny 12 them option for a stay. 13 MR. BEEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 MR. CHESLEY: Richard Chesley. We will submit an 15 order. 16 THE COURT: You don't have to formally settle 17 that, but you should run it by your counsel. And you should refer to the hearing, including the representations made on 18 19 the record of the hearing. 20 MR. CHESLEY: That's what we'll do, Your Honor. 21 Thank you. 22 THE COURT: There's no issue about that. 23 MR. BEEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. As far as the request for expedited treatment, I'm 25

Page 16 not going to grant that because I don't see a need for expedited treatment, and I don't like to give like friends upstairs more work than they need to. If you think you need to speed this up, you can -- you're free to make that request of them as time goes by. MR. CHESLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 10:45 AM)

Page 17 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Digitally signed by Sonya Landanski Hyde Sonya 6 DN: cn=Sonya Landanski Hyde, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, Landanski Hyde c=US 7 Date: 2019.09.20 15:12:57 -04'00' 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 23 Mineola, NY 11501 24 25 Date: September 20, 2019